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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade, market opening in EU network industries has been accompanied by the 
emergence of an EU-level regulatory framework. The theoretical literature on regulation 
predicts regulatory capture, which is due to information asymmetries, agency problems and 
high levels of transaction costs. Regulatory capture, in turn, is conducive to sub-optimal levels 
of prices, investment, environmental protection, and affordability/accessibility. Given this 
background, this article aims to examine the quality of regulation in EU network industries, 
with a view to assess the optimality of the European regulatory framework that combines both 
national- and EU-level regulation. The data is obtained from EU Commission sources, reports 
of European regulators, and the Market Opening Milestones database of Copenhagen 
Economics.  The paper examines both ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality in 
EU network industries. The ex ante assessment is based on indicators of regulatory 
competence and institutional strength derived from existing legislation. The ex post 
assessment is based on indicators such as market structure, prices, and customer switching, 
etc. that are affected by the quality of the regulatory framework. The paper also elaborates on 
the interaction between national- and EU-level regulation, and the implications of the two-tier 
system for the overall regulatory quality in network industries. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Over the last decade or so, network industries in the European Union (EU) have been subject 
to liberalisation reforms and regulation.
1 The wave of liberalisation and regulation began in 
the telecommunications sector, with the Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990. 
This directive provided for competition in the telecommunications market with the exception 
of voice telephony. Two further directives followed, extending liberalisation to mobile 
telephones (Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16.1.1996) and all voice telephony services 
(Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13.3.1996). As a result, the telecommunications industry 
was largely liberalised by 1998. The regulatory framework followed with some time lag. In 
March 2002, the European Parliament (EP) and Council Directive 2002/21/EC provided for a 
common regulatory framework that would be implemented by national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs). Soon after that, in July 2002, Commission Decision 2002/627/EC provided for the 
establishment of a European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications (ERG) to 
encourage coordination and diffusion of best practice between independent NRAs. 
 
Tentative attempts at liberalising the rail transport market began in 1991, with the adoption of 
Council Directive 91/440/EEC. Although this directive required some changes in the 
management of railway infrastructure and rail transport services, its main aim was to inject 
some degree of transparency into state subsidies by un-bundling the accounts and 
management of incumbent operators. The major step towards liberalisation and regulation 
was taken with the adoption of the First Railway Package on 26 February 2001. The package 
consisted of 3 directives (Directives 2001/12, 2001/13, and 2001/14), which provided for: (i) 
management independence of railway undertakings; (ii) separation between infrastructure 
management and transport operations; (iii) rules concerning allocation of infrastructure 
capacity between users; and (iv) levying of charges for the use of infrastructure. This was then 
followed by the second railway package on 29 April 2004, which provided for full cross-
border market opening for freight and passenger services by the end of 2007 and 2010, 
respectively. As part of the second railway package, the EP and Council Regulation No 
881/2004 provided for the establishment of a European Railway Agency. The agency falls 
                                                 
1 For extensive reviews of liberalisation and regulation in EU network industries, see Geradin (2006) and 
Napolitano (2005). On market opening and regulation of railways industry in particular, see Vinois (2002) and 
Scherp (2005). short of an EU-level regulatory body as its powers are limited to interoperability and common 
approach to safety. 
 
The liberalisation of electricity began with Council Directive 96/92/EC of 19.12.1996, which 
provided for common rules for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in 
the EU. The directive also provided for unbundling of accounts and required the transmission 
system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs) to dispatch and distribute 
electricity without discriminating between users. Detailed market opening provisions, 
however, had to wait until the EP and Council Directive 2003/54/EC of 26.6.2003, which 
repealed Directive 96/92/EC. The latest directive aims to: (i) ensure a level playing field in 
the generation market; (ii) reduce the risks of market dominance and predatory behaviour; and 
(iii) ensure organizational and decision-making unbundling. A similar directive (EP and 
Council Directive 2003/55/EC ) was adopted on the same date (26 June 2003) for the gas 
market. The electricity and gas directives would be implemented by 1 July 2004 - with the 
exception of some provisions on un-bundling, which can be postponed until 1 July 2007. A 
European regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) was established in November 
2003, pursuant to Commission Decision 2003/796/EC. 
 
As can be seen from the brief summary above, the timing and extent of liberalisation and 
regulation differ between sectors and across member states. Some member states have been 
granted exemptions for specific periods. Some others have been slow in transposing and/or 
implementing the relevant directives. In addition, the strength and competence of the 
emerging EU-level regulatory bodies differ from one sector to the other. In 
telecommunications and energy markets, liberalisation has been accompanied by the 
emergence of EU-level regulatory bodies. These EU-level regulatory groups consist of the 
heads or representatives of NRAs and Commission representatives. They have been given 
explicit powers to encourage coordination and adoption of best practice among NRAs across 
the range of market opening and regulatory legislation. In the rail transport, however, the 
European Railway Agency’s power has been limited only to issues of interoperability and 
safety, excluding other dimensions of liberalisation and regulation.  
 
In spite of these variations, it is possible to speak of the emergence of a ‘European order’ of 
network industry regulation (Napolitano, 2005; Geradin, 2006). The main characteristics of 
the emerging European order can be summarised as follows: (i) progressive market opening that allows for free entry of potential providers and enables consumers to switch between 
retail suppliers; (ii) unbundling of production, transmission and retail supply activities with a 
view to increase price/cost transparency and facilitate monitoring of compliance with 
competition rules; and (iii) establishment of independent national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs) complemented by EU-level regulatory bodies that have mainly a coordinating role.  
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the quality of the regulatory framework that accompanies 
the liberalisation of telecommunications, gas, electricity and rail transport markets. This is a 
timely exercise for two reasons. On the one hand, the quality of the regulatory framework is a 
significant determinant of the efficiency and welfare implications of liberalisation. On the 
other hand, the quality of network industry regulation depends on the extent to which the 
regulatory regime can ameliorate the transaction costs that arise from the strategic interaction 
between a multiplicity of actors – namely, the consumers, the government, the regulator and 
the regulated actors. To achieve this aim, the paper is organised in four sections.  
 
In section 2, we provide a review of the existing literature on the political economy of 
regulation with a view to highlight the difficulties involved in ensuring high-quality 
regulation in terms of efficiency and equity. In section 3, we examine the ex ante indicators of 
regulatory quality in EU network industries. These indicators are derived from existing 
legislation and provide some information about the extent to which the European regulatory 
framework is designed in such a way as to minimise the risks of regulatory failure or capture. 
In section 4, we look at some ex post indicators such as market structure, prices, extent of 
consumer switching, changes in customer perceptions of accessibility/affordability, etc. The 
ex post indicators will provide some information about the extent to which the European 
regulatory framework has been effective in addressing the inefficiency implications of the 
monopolistic/oligopolistic market structures that characterise network industries. Finally, the 
conclusion will bring together the main findings and elaborate on the scope for improving the 
quality of the European regulatory framework through interaction between EU- and national-
level regulatory authorities.  2.  The political economy of network industry regulation  
 
Network industry regulation is an institutional design issue that has to deal with information 
asymmetries and agency problems that affect the strategic interaction between four sets of 
actors: (i) the consumers of network industries; (ii) the suppliers of network industry 
products/services; (iii) the regulator as the agent of the government; and (iv) the government 
as the principal who appoint the regulator. Information asymmetries and transaction costs 
combine to prevent the design of complete contracts between these actors. In the absence of 
complete (i.e., fully contingent) contracts, the interaction between any pair of these actors 
may lead to sub-optimal outcomes that emerge either as inadequate or as excessive regulation.  
 
The debate on regulation has tended to focus on pair-wise or triangular relationship between 
the actors involved in the process of regulation. For example, the ‘commission inadequacy’ 
approach that dates back to 1930s focuses on the weakness of the regulator and the 
implications of this weakness for the relationship between the regulator and the regulated. The 
pioneering work of Frankfurter (1930) and Trachsel (1950) demonstrate that personnel 
weaknesses or resource inadequacy limit the ability of the regulator to acquire the necessary 
information that would minimise the ability of the regulated firm to extract rents.  
 
This analysis is supported by economics and political science approaches based on group 
theory (Berry, 1982). One of the earliest works on the politics of regulation (Bersntein, 1955) 
demonstrates that the regulator will tend to protect the interest of the regulated industry. This 
is because the diffused majority (customers of the regulated industries) will gradually lose 
interest in regulation as the organised minority (the incumbents of the regulated industries) 
become more united given the large stakes involved. This line of argument has drawn further 
support from Olson’s (1965) analysis of collective action problems faced by large groups and 
from the work of Wilson (1974) who demonstrates that the regulatory outcomes will benefit 
the regulated group as the latter will be more likely to organise and influence the regulatory 
decisions. The explanatory variable for this outcome is group size: as group size decreases 
(increase) each member of the group will avoid high (low) levels of costs or reap high (low) 
levels of benefit when they organise to influence the regulatory decisions in their own favour. 
Given that the group size of the regulated companies is always smaller than the group size of 
the consumers, the former will be always more likely to organise and influence regulatory 
decisions.   
Early group theories in economics also focus on pair-wise relationship between the regulator 
and the regulated. The difference here, however, stems from the fact that the regulator is 
modelled as an agent who maximises its own objective function – and not as a passive 
arbitrator between consumer and producer interests. The regulator here is equated with the 
government or the legislative, whose interest in re-election interact with regulated group 
interests to determine the regulatory outcomes (Berry, 1982). For example Stigler (1971) 
demonstrates that regulation will be excessive and will fail to uphold the interest of the 
consumers. This is because the regulator (i.e., the government or the legislative organ) will 
trade off the loss of consumer support with the regulated group’s ‘campaign donations’ that 
can be used to increase the chance of re-election. As a result of this trade-off, consumer 
interests are not upheld and the regulated industry’s demand for regulation tends to increase. 
The demand for regulation increases because regulation-demanding industries know that they 
can capture the regulator through campaign donations or side-payments or a combination of 
both.  
 
Peltzman (1976) refines Stigler’s model and arrives at a similar conclusion: regulation will 
typically entail less than prefect producer protection but also less than perfect protection for 
consumers. Incentive for ‘regulator entry’ is highest when the industry is monopolistic or 
perfectly competitive. In the case of monopolistic markets, the politician (the principal 
appointing the regulator) can trade off moderate political losses with producers for a large 
political gain among consumers. Regulation may increase social welfare in this case, but this 
is not the main reason why regulatory bodies are established. In the case of perfectly 
competitive market, regulation will also be excessive because the loss of consumer support 
due to regulation of a perfectly competitive industry can be traded off against donations from 
the regulated industry itself. Drawing on US data, Jarrell (1978) provides evidence that state 
regulation was in greatest demand, and was thus established earliest, in states with the more 
competitive markets for electricity. 
 
The problem with this type of modelling is that it says very little about how the benefits of the 
politician or regulator materialise. In addition, neither producers nor consumers are active, 
strategic players. They are only characterised by certain group characteristics that render them 
either latent (in the case of consumers) or active lobbyists (in the case of producers). The 
outcome of the interaction between these groups is almost immediate: lobbies influence the regulatory policy in their own favour and the regulator (equated with the political actor) 
maximises a welfare function that favours producers. (Dal Bo, 2006; Estache and Martimort, 
1999) 
 
Tirole (1986) and Laffon and Tirole (1993) try to address this shortcoming by analysing 
regulatory capture in a three-tier setting involving the government, the regulator, and the 
regulated. The interaction between these actors is analysed in two stages. In stage one, the 
firm has private information about its cost, which is not yet known to the regulator or 
government. The latter agrees on offering the firm a second-best contract, with some rents for 
the firms. During the regulation process, the regulator increases its information about the 
firm’s cost structure. This learning process instigates the second stage of the game, where the 
firm negotiates with the regulator before the latter decides how much information it should 
pass on to the government. The firm has incentives to bribe the regulator, who may decide to 
take or decline the bribe. If the regulator takes the bribe, the firm continues to extract rents 
that it shares with the regulator. If the regulator declines, then no rents remain. The problem 
for the government (i.e., the principal) is then to design a regulatory regime that would offer 
the regulator a contract that will induce him not to lie about the firm’s cost structure and to 
offer the firm a contract that will provide the latter with rents that are just enough to prevent it 
from colluding with the regulator (Dal Bo, 2006: 207). 
 
The regulatory quality implied by this analysis is better than that predicted by earlier work. 
However, the regulatory regime is still not optimal as it is essentially a second-best 
compromise resulting from the government’s inability to draw a complete contract with the 
regulator or the regulated company or both. Therefore, the impact of regulation on prices and 
social welfare is indeterminate at best and may be negative. In fact, existing empirical work 
tend to report pessimistic findings. 
For example, Moore (1975) examines the impact of regulation on state-level electricity prices 
in the US and reports that regulation was unsuccessful in lowering prices below monopoly 
levels. Using commission man-hours of regulation per individual in each state in 1947, 1953, 
1960 and 1966, he also reports that the situation was not improving over time – i.e., 
regulator’s learning process is not necessarily leading to better regulatory outcomes. Similarly, 
Upadhyaya and Raymond (1994) use cross-sectional US data for 1922, 1927 and 1932 and 
report that regulation remains ineffective in lowering that price of electricity. There are similar findings from time-series US data too. For example, Upadhyaya and Mixon (1995) 
use national US time-series data for 1918-53 and regress the electricity prices on 4 variables: 
population growth, hydro-power generation, technology and regulation. They report that all 
vairables except regulation are significant determinants of prices in that period. The parameter 
for egulation has the correct sign (i.e., it is negative), but it is statistically insignificant. Finally, 
Mitra et al (2005) also report that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission Orders of 1996 did not lead to production or cost efficiency in the 
US electricity market between 1983-1999. 
 
Despite these pessimistic findings, it is difficult to make a case against regulation of network 
industries mainly because market opening in these industries does not put an end to 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures that are essentially due to natural monopoly 
characteristics of these industries. In the absence of regulation, the level of prices and 
monopoly rents may be even higher. Therefore, regulation is necessary to reduce distortions 
that arise from market power but it is not necessarily sufficient to achieve optimal outcomes. 
The task, then, is to determine the factors that may improve the efficiency of the regulator. 
This is nothing but identifying contractual mechanisms that will address information 
asymmetries and principal-agent problems inherent in the design of network industry 
regulation. 
 
Estache and Martimort (1999) provide an extensive review of the existing literature on the 
design of regulatory institutions and relate the findings of this literature to concerns raised by 
practitioners of regulatory policy. Their review can be used as a basis for identifying some 
contractual design characteristics that would minimise the informational asymmetries and 
principal-agent problems that increase the transaction costs of network industry regulation. 
Table 1 below summarises the causes and implications of transaction costs and the 
mechanisms through which regulatory framework design may minimise these transaction 
costs.  
Table 1: Minimising transaction costs through regulatory framework design 
 
Sources of transaction costs  Adverse effects  
on regulatory outcomes 
How to minimise the adverse effects 
Conflict between 
commitment and ex post 
efficiency: incompleteness of 
the regulatory contract makes 
periodic renegotiations 
necessary and/or efficient. 
Prospect of renegotiations 
generates perverse incentives for 
the regulated firm in period 1. The 
firm under-invests in specific 
assets and chooses inefficient 
technology to manipulate the 
regulator’s beliefs about its 
performance in period 2. 
•  Create independent regulatory 
bodies to improve commitment; 
•  Create multiple regulatory bodies 
with complementary 
competences; 
•  Combine commitment rules with 
rules for fine-tuning. 
 
Multiple agency problems in 
government: competition 
between departments and 
bureaucracies for distribution 
of regulatory rights and rents. 
 
Sub-optimal regulation due to 
multiplicity of regulators: 
excessive regulation when 
regulated activities are 
complement; inadequate 
regulation when activities are 
substitutes. 
 
 
•  Optimise the number of 
regulatory bodies with 
complementary competences; 
•  Improve information through 
benchmarking; 
•  Enable regulators to share 
information; 
•  Make regulators accountable to a 
single elected authority. 
 
Discretion of the political 
principal: politicians tend to 
maximise welfare or median 
voter (constituency) rather 
than social welfare. 
 
Politicians design sub-optimal 
regulatory contracts that maximise 
favours from the regulated 
industry. 
 
•  Establish regulatory bodies with 
board structure – to resolve 
representation problems; 
•  Increase accountability of the 
political principal. 
 
Discretion of the regulator: 
regulators strike side 
contracts with regulated firms 
with a view extract rents. 
 
With too much discretion and 
autonomy, regulators try to 
maximise regulatory rents; with 
too little discretion and autonomy, 
regulators tend to prefer the status 
quo.  
 
•  Increase accountability of the 
regulator; 
•  Increase information on the 
regulator’s performance; 
•  Introduce collusion-proof 
constraints – e.g. performance 
incentives coupled with banning 
future employment of regulator in 
regulated industries. 
 
Source: Estache and Mitra (1999). 
 
The summary in Table 1 enables us to identify a number of necessary conditions for 
minimising the transaction costs associated with regulation in general and network industry 
regulation in particular. These conditions are: (i) independence and autonomy of the regulator 
vis-à-vis the regulated industry and the political principal; (ii) an optimum degree of 
competition between regulators with complementary competences; (iii) accountability of the 
regulator; (iv) availability of information about regulatory outcomes that can be used for 
monitoring purposes and that of industry-specific information to be shared between regulators; 
and (v) anti-collusion measures that would prevent collusion between the regulator and the regulated industry. These are necessary to reduce the risk of regulatory capture but they by no 
means ensure the achievement of optimal regulatory outcomes with respect to prices, 
environmental protection standards or investment.  
 
One reason is that these conditions may work at cross-purposes. For example, the co-
existence of multiple regulators with complementary competences is a necessary condition to 
minimise the risk of regulatory capture. However, minimising the risk of regulatory capture 
through this measure does not ensure that the level of regulatory toughness is optimal 
(Estache and Martimort, 1999: 6). This is because a regulator with a specific area of 
competence (e.g., price regulation) decides on the level of regulation in that area without 
having to compete with another regulator in the same area. On the contrary, it competes with 
another regulator in a complementary area of competence (e.g., a regulator regulating the 
level of investment or environmental protection). This type of regulatory externality reduces 
the risk of ‘a drive to the bottom’ with respect to regulatory toughness – i.e., it reduces the 
risk of regulatory capture. However, it may also increase the risk of over-regulation, which 
leaves less incentive for companies to operate efficiently after regulation.  This anti-efficiency 
bias may result because tough regulatory standards will reduce the ‘efficiency rents’ that the 
company can hold on to - the efficiency gains will have to be passed on to consumers via 
lower prices, higher environmental protection standards or higher levels of investment in 
network infrastructure.  
 
The second reason is that there can be no ready-made answers to questions concerning the 
optimal number of regulators with complementary competences in a particular industry. Nor 
are there clear-cut indicators about the optimum levels of information required. The optimal 
number of competing regulators or the optimal level of information will differ across 
countries, legal traditions, and other intervening institutional variables. Put it differently, the 
optimal level of regulatory competition or information can be established only after a period 
of ‘trial and error’ in the process of optimisation.  
 
For these reasons the necessary conditions above should be considered as relevant for an ex 
ante assessment regulatory quality – and not as sufficient conditions that would deliver 
optimal regulatory quality ex post. Once viewed from this perspective, the necessary 
conditions listed above can be seen as useful yardsticks for assessing the risk of regulatory 
capture that, together with other factors, determines the optimality of regulatory outcomes.   
 
3.   Ex ante indicators of regulatory quality in EU network industries 
 
Given the caveat above, we examine the ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality in 
EU network industries separately. This is necessary not only to avoid hasty generalisations 
about the optimality of the regulatory outcomes but also to increase the tractability of the 
findings.  
 
3.1.  Co-existence of EU and national regulatory bodies 
 
One aspect of the emerging regulatory regime in EU network industries is the co-existence of 
both national and EU-level legislation as well as regulatory bodies. From a political economy 
perspective, this co-existence may satisfy one of the necessary conditions – namely, the 
existence of multiple regulators. The European regulatory regime is likely to satisfy this 
necessary condition if it can be demonstrated that the regulatory activity at the EU and 
national levels occurs in complementary rather than substitute areas of competence. If the 
areas of competence are complementary – for example, if national regulators regulate prices 
while EU-level regulators regulate market access or environmental impact – the risk of 
regulatory capture decreases. This is because each regulator will set and/or implement 
standards in its own area of competence without having to worry about the ability of the 
regulated companies to opt for the jurisdiction of the other regulator who offers a less strict 
regulation in the same area.  
 
The emerging European regulatory regime in network industries addresses this condition in 
two ways. First, national-level and EU-level regulatory legislation is complementary rather 
than substitutes. Complementarity is ensured by the requirement to transpose and implement 
EU rules where the latter differ from national rules and by the applicability of national rules 
when EU-level rules do not exist. Therefore, in principle, a company in a particular member 
state cannot play the EU-level of regulatory standards against the national-level standards 
with a view to secure a lower level of regulatory toughness. Secondly, national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) and the newly established EU regulatory bodies such as ERG or ERGEG 
are not competing regulators. In fact, ERG and ERGEG consist of the heads or representatives 
of the NRAs. In addition, EU-level regulatory bodies have mainly a coordinating role aimed at increasing the level of convergence between national regulatory regimes and encouraging 
the adoption of best practice. Of course, during the process of convergence, some countries 
with high regulatory standards may well have to accept some dilution in their standards or the 
rate of improvement in their regulatory standards may slow down. However, this will be due 
to bargaining between national governments rather than regulatory capture.  
 
Majone (2000, 2002) has written extensively on the issue of regulation in the wider context of 
European integration. His main argument, supported by qualitative evidence, is that an 
extended network of national, sub-national, and EU-level regulatory bodies are operating in 
various areas of regulatory activity in the EU. In this triangular set up, European regulatory 
agencies act as central nodes that encourage ‘efficient cooperation, coordination and adoption 
of best practice’. The emerging regulatory regime in EU network industries possesses some of 
these characteristics and therefore it alleviates the risk of regulatory capture at national levels.  
 
However, there are a number of factors that militate against a significant reduction in the risk 
of regulatory capture in EU network industries. First of all, even the necessary conditions for 
effectiveness, as identified by Majone in a wider context, are not satisfied. Majone (2002) 
identifies three conditions for effectiveness: (i) high levels of mutual trust and cooperation 
between agencies; (ii) high levels of professionalism; and (iii) a common regulatory 
philosophy. Even if one assumes that condition (ii) is satisfied, there are a number of factors 
that militate against the satisfaction of conditions (i) and (iii).  
 
One reason is that the stance of NRA representatives in the meetings of EU-level regulatory 
groups may be determined not only by concerns about convergence, but also by concerns 
about maintaining the idiosyncrasies of the national regimes. Secondly, there is a high degree 
of divergence between national regulatory standards and the scope of EU-level regulatory 
legislation is not comprehensive enough to ensure significant convergence. In other words, 
the EU-level regulatory legislation provides only for a regulatory framework, leaving detailed 
legislation to be adopted at the national level. (See, Coen and Doyle, 2000). Finally, the 
European regulatory regime does not allow for jurisdiction shopping. However, it has little or 
no remedies against the pressure that regulated companies can exert on national governments 
with high regulatory standards so that the latter lower the national standards towards EU 
average.  
 In addition, European liberalisation and regulatory reforms tend to result from sub-optimal 
compromises determined by bargaining between member states, between the latter and the 
commission, and between the member states and regulated industries. (See, Heritier, 2001). 
Therefore, factors related to the process of EU policy making (e.g., bargaining, multiplicity of 
political actors, compromises, etc.) and the essentially national character of the regulatory 
legislation are likely to limit the gains from reduced risk of regulatory capture that is due to 
the co-existence of EU- and national-level regulatory frameworks.  
 
Coen and Doyle (2000: 24-25) argue that the solution to this problem is to establish a 
European regulatory agency, that is independent of both national governments and European 
institutions. This agency could incorporate existing national regulatory bodies and allow for 
some national variance. However, the agency’s regulatory decisions should be binding and it 
should not be dependent on NRAs to enforce common directives. Clearly, the emerging 
European regulatory regime for network industries is still far from satisfying this condition. 
As Napolitano (2005: 567) has observed, the emerging regualtory regime defines ‘scopes and 
techniques for safeguarding universal service and shapes the nature, powers and procedures of 
the national regulatory authorities.’ Nevertheless, this regime is still incomplete as member 
atates are still preserving autonomy.  
 
 
3.2  Regulatory strength, independence and competence 
 
Another ex ante indicator of regulatory quality is the independence and autonomy of the 
regulator. As indicated above, regulator’s independence and autonomy is necessary to resolve 
the government’s commitment problem and to reduce the risk of regulatory capture by the 
regulated industry. Table 2 below provides some indicators of regulatory independence and 
autonomy – depicted as regulatory competence and institutional strength/resources. While 
regulatory competence refers to the range of market outcomes that a national regulator is 
empowered to regulate, institutional strength/resources refer to the extent to which that 
regulator is equipped to regulate the specified market outcomes. The data in the table is 
derived from a thorough examination of the national regulatory legislation and the resources 
available to national regulators. 
 The institutional strength/resources indicator is constructed by aggregating a number of sub-
indicators that capture the national regulator’s independence of the government, budgetary 
allowance, number of personnel weighted by population, and whether the regulator share 
power with other governmental bodies. Each sub-indicator is assigned a value that ranges 
between 0 and 1, depending on the level of independence, relative budget/personnel size, and 
the extent of power sharing. The overall institutional strength/resources indicator is a simple 
average of the sub-indicators. Similarly, the regulatory competence indicator also consists of a 
number of sub-indicators measuring the regulator’s competence with respect to regulation of 
prices for different types of consumers and network users, conditions of access to the network, 
and quality of service. The overall competence indicator is a simple average of the sub-
indicators. A value close to 0 indicates highly limited competence whereas a value close to 1 
indicates high level of competence. 
 
Table 2: Indicators of regulatory competence and institutional strength/resources 
 
  Electricity Regulator  Gas Regulator Telecom  Regulator 
 
Institutional 
strength / 
resources 
Scope of 
regulatory 
competence 
Institutional 
strength / 
resources 
Scope of 
regulatory 
competence 
Institutional 
strength / 
resources 
Scope of 
regulatory 
competence 
Austria  0.64 0.26 0.73 0.39 0.54 0.56 
Belgium  0.66 0.61 0.86 0.48 0.61 0.72 
Denmark  0.43 0.38 0.48 0.33 0.72 0.70 
Finland  0.49 0.40 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.35 
France  0.28 0.51 0.46 0.27 0.39 0.43 
Germany  0.04 0.43 0.00 0.22 0.65 0.80 
Greece 0.37  0.38  0.42 0.00 0.57 0.58 
Ireland  0.76 0.62 0.94 0.47 0.57 0.60 
Italy  0.42 0.48 0.40 0.61 0.53 0.63 
Luxemburg 0.48 0.36 0.51 0.29 0.67 0.53 
The  N/lands  0.43 0.46 0.40 0.51 0.40 0.53 
Portugal  0.69 0.36 0.54 0.00 0.55 0.45 
Spain  0.25 0.60 0.29 0.45 0.59 0.70 
Sweden  0.61 0.50 0.67 0.14 0.46 0.40 
UK  0.74 0.57 0.69 0.58 0.49 0.56 
EU-15 
Average  0.49 0.46 0.54 0.32 0.55 0.57 
Coefficient of 
variation  (%)  41.72 23.24 43.61 65.99 16.64 22.43 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Market Opening Milestones Database 
 The evidence in Table 2 paints a mixed picture about regulatory competence and institutional 
strength/resources in the three markets for which data is available: electricity, gas and 
telecommunications. One observation that can be made is that existing NRAs, on average, do 
not enjoy a high degree of institutional strength/resources. The highest level of institutional 
strength/resources is enjoyed by the regulators of the telecommunications industry at 0.55, 
followed by 0.54 for the gas regulators and 0.49 for the electricity regulators. These findings 
suggest that existing NRAs, on average, enjoy only about half of the level of 
strength/resources that a fully-fledged regulator is expected to enjoy. These relatively low 
levels of strength/resources are likely to imply a significant risk of regulatory capture – as 
predicted by ‘commission inadequacy’ or ‘informational asymmetry’ theories of regulation. 
 
The second observation is that there is a significant degree of variation in the regulators’ 
strength/resources across member states. The coefficient of variation is highest for the 
regulators of the gas industry (at 43.61%) followed by the regulators of the electricity industry 
(at 41.72%) and telecommunications industry (at 16.64%). Therefore, with the exception of 
the telecommunications industry, the divergence between the strengths/resources of the NRAs 
is significant. This divergence is underpinned by the fact that about half of the national 
regulators are equipped with strength/resources that are less than EU-15 average. The 
implication here is that further coordination within EU-level regulatory bodies is needed to 
encourage the adoption of best practice with respect to regulatory strength/resources. 
 
The third observation relates to the scope of regulatory competence. Weaknesses concerning 
institutional strength/resources are also observable in the regulatory competence indicator too. 
On average, NRAs tend to have competence in only about one-third to 50% of the full range 
of competence areas. The level of regulatory competence is highest in the telecommunications 
industry (at 0.57) and lowest in the gas industry (at 0.32.). In addition, the extent of 
divergence between regulatory competences of the NRAs is highest in the gas industry (at 
65.99%) and lowest in the electricity and telecommunications industries (at 23.24% and 
22.43%, respectively). The implication here is that member states with low regulatory 
competence are likely to have a dampening effect on the development of regulatory 
competence in the rest of the EU due to the artificial competitive edge that low regulatory 
competence provides.  
 What is also significant is the extent of correlation between the scope of regulatory 
competence and institutional strength/resources of the regulators. A high level of correlation 
between the two indicators would suggest that NRAs are equipped with the level of resources 
that is in line with the range of regulatory competences they have. A low level of correlation, 
on the other hand, would indicate that the level of resources is either too high or too low 
compared to the range of regulatory competences. Table 3 below provides the Pearson rank 
correlation between the two indicators in 2003. 
 
Table 3: Correlation between regulatory competence and institutional 
strength/resources: 2003 
 
Variables 
Pearson’s Rank  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
Significance 
Regulatory competence vs institutional strength/resources: electricity   0.118  n.s 
Regulatory competence vs institutional strength/resources: gas  0.139 n.s. 
Regulatory competence vs institutional strength/resources: 
telecommunications 
0.587 ** 
n.s. = not statistically significant;  ** = significant at 5% 
  
The results indicate that the correlation coefficient is very low and it is not statistically 
significant in the electricity and gas industries. In the telecommunications industry, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.587 and it is statistically significant. Therefore, it is possible to 
argue that there is a degree of correlation between regulatory competence and institutional 
strength/resources in the telecommunications industry – even though the correlation is not 
strong. However, such an argument cannot be made about the regulators of electricity and gas 
industries. In these industries, there are two types of national anomalies whereby the 
regulatory competence is not matched with institutional strength/resources of vice versa. Such 
anomalies can be traced in Table 2. 
 
The first type of anomaly concerns high levels of institutional strength/resources combined 
with low levels of regulatory competence. This is evident in the case of electricity regulators 
in Austria and the UK, which have significant levels of institutional strength/resources (0.64 
and 0.74, respectively) but relatively limited scope of regulatory competence (0.26 and 0.57, 
respectively). In the gas industry, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Sweden display similar anomalies. In the case of telecommunications, Finland falls into the same category. These discrepancies suggest that NRAs in these countries/industries are 
equipped with relatively high levels of institutional strength/resources, but these resources are 
not deployed across a wide range of regulatory competences. The implication here is that 
regulators in these countries/industries may be effective in regulating a limited number of 
market outcomes, but this effectiveness is obtained at a cost of weak or no regulation with 
respect to other outcomes. A less optimistic interpretation is that regulators in these countries 
are essentially bureaucratic institutions that have managed to increase their budgets beyond 
what their regulatory competence would justify. 
 
The second type of anomaly is the mirror image of the first: low institutional 
strength/resources coupled with high levels of regulatory competence. The French and 
Spanish regulators in the electricity industry, the Spanish regulator in the gas industry, and the 
French and the Dutch regulators in the telecommunications industry fall into this category. 
The implication for regulatory quality here is that these regulators spread their powers too 
thinly over a large number of regulatory targets. Therefore, their regulatory decisions are 
more likely to be open to the risk of regulatory capture. 
 
3.3  Transparency 
 
The final ex ante indicator we examine relates to the level of transparency. Transparency is 
necessary not only to enable end-users or users of the network to choose between different 
suppliers or network operators. It is also necessary to monitor the performance of the 
regulator in terms of its effect on prices, market structure, and other criteria. In this section, 
we examine only the first type of transparency as the second type can be measured only ex 
post.  Data availability limits the exercise to the electricity and gas industries, the 
transparency indicators of which are provided in Table 4 below. 
 
The index in Table 4 is derived from NRA responses to a questionnaire sent by ERGEG – the 
EU-level regulatory group for gas and electricity markets. It is constructed as follows: for 
each transparency criterion, we assign a value of 1 if the response from the NRA confirms 
transparency; a value between 0.25 - 0.75 if the answer is qualified; and a value of 0 if the 
answer confirms that the criterion is not met. The index in the last column and last row is the 
sum of indices in each cell divided by the number of countries (the last row of the table) or by the number of criteria (the last column of the table). Criteria (C1-C7) are described in the note 
under the table.  
 
The table shows that no member state satisfies the condition of full transparency with respect 
to all criteria. Similarly, no single criterion is satisfied by all member states. In addition, 
ERGEG (2005) explicitly states that NRAs did not provide detailed information about how 
transparency is ensured when they report that this is the case. In other words, the index is 
actually too generous a measure of transparency. Despite this, the overall level of 
transparency is 0.56 - with significant inter-country variation from 0.11 to 0.89 and inter-
criteria variation from 0.42 to 0.77.  
 
Table 4: NRA responses concerning price transparency for gas and electricity: 2005 
         Transparency   
  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7  Index 
Spain    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00  0.11 
Sweden    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00  0.29 
France    1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00  0.32 
Portugal    0.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00  0.32 
Ireland    0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.00  0.43 
Italy    1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50  0.50 
Finland    1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.50  0.68 
Austria    1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.71 
Greece   1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.71 
Netherlands    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00  0.82 
Belgium    1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00  0.89 
Great  Britain    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 1.00  0.89 
EU-12  Av.    0.77 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.42  0.56 
Source: Derived from NRA answers in ERGEG (2005: 14, 15, 18). 
 
Transparency index:  
1.00 = full transparency;  0.25 – 0.75 = incomplete transparency;   0 = no transparency 
Transparency criteria: 
C1: Publication of list price is required (by default supplier) 
C2: Publication of offer price is required (by new supplier or when moving to a different tariff)  
C3: Does every supplier publish prices or just the incumbent? 
C4: Does supplier provide price information to the regulator or another body? 
C5: When are prices published: before or after the price change? 
C6: How can a customer compare prices: platform for information and who provides it? 
C7: Is comparability of prices ensured? 
 According to ERGEG (2005: 5), the lack of transparency benefits incumbents, undermines the 
position of new entrants, and aggravates consumer mistrust in the price formation mechanism. 
That is why the EU Commission (2007: 8) reports that all network users demand more 
transparency and that there is little harmonisation between member-state transparency 
requirements. These official evaluations confirm the low levels of the transparency index we 
present in Table 4 and enable us to conclude that NRAs regulating the electricity and gas 
industries do not yet satisfy the transparency condition for effective regulation. The EU and 
EU-level regulatory bodies recognise the risk associated with this lack of transparency, but 
they are still unable to ensure convergent compliance by NRAs despite existing EU 
legislation. The very low levels of transparency requirements allowed by NRAs in Spain, 
Sweden, France, Italy, Portugal and Italy are bound to have negative effects on regulatory 
effectiveness in these countries. They are also likely to dampen the rate of increase in 
transparency requirements in other member states. 
 
This conclusion is supported by ERGEG (2006: 7-8), who reports that national regulators are 
unable to fulfil their tasks of monitoring and date collection. Enforcement powers in these 
areas are in most cases inadequate. What is also alarming is the fact that the consequences of 
non-compliance are often not proportional to the potential gains that companies reap when 
they do not provide the data. They are either too small or too drastic to be credible. The 
consequence is that the regulators are unable to cover the whole range of ex ante regulation 
and ex-post monitoring foreseen by the EU directives for gas and electricity.  
 
The evidence presented so far is by no means exhaustive, however it provides some useful 
insights into the extent to which the emerging regulatory regime in EU network industries 
satisfies the ex ante conditions for minimising the risk of regulatory capture. On the one hand, 
the design of the European regulatory regime is in line with the normative implications of the 
economic theory of regulation. Specifically, the emerging regime consists of a two-level 
regulatory framework consisting of EU- and national-level regulation. This design reduces the 
risk of excessively lenient regulation, but it is compromised by the need for extensive 
bargaining and compromises required in the EU decision-making process. On the other hand, 
the emerging regime combines both strong and weak national regulators in terms of 
regulatory competence and institutional strength/resources. This mixture may be interpreted 
as a reflection of transition towards more convergence across member states. However, and until such convergence occurs by moving towards higher standards, the existing arrangements 
are essentially sub-optimal. This is due to relatively low levels of regulatory competence and 
strength/resources as well as to mismatch between the two dimensions of the regulatory 
independence/autonomy.  Finally, although we do not have transparency data for 
telecommunications and rail transport, the existing data for gas and electricity suggest that the 
European regulatory regime does not satisfy the ex ante transparency criteria.  
 
These deviations from the necessary conditions are highly likely to reduce the effectiveness of 
the emerging regulatory regime in EU network industries. The next section examines some ex 
post indicators of regulatory quality with a view to develop a more complete picture about the 
outcomes of the European regulatory regime.  
 
4.   Ex post indicators of regulatory quality and regulatory outcomes  
 
In this section, we examine evidence on market outcomes that can be associated with the 
degree of regulation in EU network industries. We begin with the correlation between the 
extent of market liberalisation and the indicators of regulatory competence as well as 
institutional strength/competence. The coefficients of correlation for these two variables are 
given in Table 5 below. The market opening index (MOI) and regulatory indicators are from 
Copenhagen Economics Market Opening Milestones database. The MOI and the regulatory 
indicators are calculated for EU-15 countries in 2003. The MOI is weighted by the number of 
years during which the level of market opening in a particular EU member has been equal to 
or greater than 0.3 by the cut-off date in 2003.  
 
4.1  Regulatory indicators and market opening 
 
Theoretically, we would expect the regulatory competence and the institutional 
strength/resources of the regulators to increase in line with the level of market opening. This 
is because liberalisation of network industries constitutes a move from a state-owned 
monopoly towards an oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive market that requires 
effective regulation. Without effective regulation, the monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
can lead to distorted prices, output levels or investment levels.  
  
Table 5: Correlation between weighted MOI and regulatory quality: 2003 
 
Variables 
Pearson’s Rank  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
Significance 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Electricity regulator’s institutional 
strength/resources in 2003 
 0.326  n.s 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Electricity regulator’s regulatory competence 
in 2003 
0.278 n.s. 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Gas regulator’s institutional strength/resources 
in 2003 
0.162 n.s. 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Gas regulator’s regulatory competence in 2003  0.600  ** 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Telecomms regulator’s institutional 
strength/resources in 2003 
-0.084 n.s. 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Telecomms regulator’s regulatory competence 
in 2003 
0.110 n.s. 
n.s. = not statistically significant;  * = significant at 10% 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Market Opening Milestones Databse. 
 
 
When Table 5 is examined from this perspective, we can see that the coefficients of 
correlation between the MOI and the regulatory indicators are rather low and statistically not 
significant – with the exception of the gas industry. In the latter, the coefficient is 0.6 and it is 
statistically significant at 10% level. These results enable us to argue that the cross-country 
data for 2003 does not indicate a statistically significant correlation between the level of 
liberalisation and regulatory institution building in EU network industries. This could be 
either because regulatory institution building has been lagging behind the level of 
liberalisation or vice versa. Irrespective of which is the case, it is safe to conclude that there is 
a high degree of arbitrariness in the way in which the European regulatory framework has 
been taking shape over the last decade. The gas industry is an exception that proves the rule: 
we observe a high and statistically significant degree of correlation in this industry because 
both the weighted market opening index and the level of regulatory competence in this 
industry has been low. The low level of regulatory competence is confirmed in Table 2 above. 
The low levels of weighted MOI for the gas industry are confirmed in Ugur (2007a: 25). 4.2  Regulatory indicators and prices 
 
The second ex post indicator of regulatory quality we examine is the correlation between 
regulatory competence and institutional strength/resources on the one hand and the level of 
prices in 2005. Theoretically, market liberalisation and regulation are expected to lead to 
lower prices over time and across countries. The results reported in Table 6 below reflect the 
degree of correlation between the variables across 15 EU member states. While the indicators 
of regulatory competence and institutional strength/resources are for 2003, the price levels are 
for 2005 – to allow time for the regulatory indicators to have an effect on prices. The price 
levels in 2005 are given as price indices for which the base year is 2007. This specification is 
more appropriate than absolute prices because prices differ between countries irrespective of 
the degree of regulation. By normalising all prices to 100 in 1997, the price index in 2005 
provides a clear indication about whether prices have been falling or increasing as the process 
of market opening and regulation sets in. 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix for regulatory indicators in 2003 and the price index (PI) in 
2005 (1997=100). 
 
 Electricity 
Industrial 
PI 
Electricity  
Household 
PI 
Gas 
Industrial 
PI 
Gas 
H/hold 
PI 
Telecomm 
Local calls 
PI 
Telecomm 
National 
calls PI 
Electricity 
regulator’s  
Institutional 
strength 
0.049 
n.s. 
0.190 
n.s. 
      
Electricity 
regulator’s  
Competence 
0.033 
n.s. 
-0.109 
n.s. 
      
Gas 
Regulator’s 
institutional 
strength 
   0.027 
n.s. 
-0.166 
n.s. 
  
Gas 
Regulator’s  
Competence 
   -0.083 
n.s. 
-0.112 
n.s. 
  
Telecom 
Regulator’s 
institutional 
strength 
      0.109 
n.s. 
-0.307 
n.s. 
Telecom 
Regulator’s 
Competence 
      0.011 
n.s. 
-0.449 
n.s. 
n.s. = statistically not significant. 
 The results reported in Table 6 indicate that none of the coefficients of correlation is 
statistically significant. In addition, half of the coefficients have the wrong sign - i.e., they are 
positive. Ignoring statistical significance, this indicates that member states with higher levels 
of regulatory competence and/or institutional strength tend to have higher prices. This is in 
conflict with the expected effect of regulation on prices. The remaining half of the coefficients 
have the correct sign – i.e., they are negative – but these coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. Finally, all except one coefficient (-0.449 in the bottom right corner) are very 
close to zero. Again ignoring statistical significance and wrong signs, small values of the 
coefficients indicate that the association between measures of regulatory quality and national 
prices is quite weak across member states. Given these results, it is possible to conclude that 
member states with higher levels of regulatory activity in 2003 did not necessarily enjoy 
lower gas, electricity or telephone call prices in 2005.  
 
One reason for these disappointing results could be that the European regulatory regimes are 
still in the making. Some member states such as the UK, Sweden, Austria and Belgium have 
had independent regulators for gas and electricity since mid-1990s. These regulators have 
either advisory or concurrent powers that they share with the competition authorities. (EU 
Commission, 2005b: 22). Some others such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the 
UK have also had well-established regulators in the telecommunications industry. However, 
the EU-level legislation that provides for independent regulators was adopted quite recently in 
early 2000s. In addition, regulators in the majority of EU countries are either new or not 
independent of the government. Therefore, the absence of association between regulatory 
quality indicators and prices may be related to ‘teething problems’ of the emerging regulatory 
regime in EU network industries.  
 
However, there is no guarantee that the European regulators will become more effective as 
they become better established and move up on their learning curves. Evidence on US 
regulators does not support the argument that regulatory performance improves over time. As 
Moore (1975) has indiacted, the increase in the regulator’s resources over four observation 
years (1947, 1953, 1960 and 1966) did not lead to lower prices. This finding is supported by 
Upadhyaya and Raymond (1994), who use cross-sectional US data for 1922, 1927 and 1932 
and report that regulation remains ineffective in lowering the price of electricity over time. 
Finally, Upadhyaya and Mixon (1995) use national US time-series data for 1918-53 and 
report that regulatory indicators do not have a significant effect on prices.   
Given these findings, the extent of market concentration and the ability of the incumbents to 
manipulate prices acquire added significance in explaining regulatory outcomes. EU 
Commission (2005a: 5) reports the results of an inquiry into distortions to competition in 
European network industries. The findings indicate that the gas and electricity amrkets in 
many member states remain concentrated and create scope for incumbents to influence prices. 
In addition, many wholesale markets are illiquid either due to long term contracts (gas) or 
because companies are active both in production and in the retail markets (electricity). Thirdly, 
there is insufficient unbundling of network and supply activities. Finally, the lack of 
transparency benefits incumbents and undermines the position of new entrants. This lack of 
transparency aggravates mistrust in the price formation mechanisms in the retail and 
wholesale markets.  
Similarly, the number of major operators in the telecommunications industry has remained 
very small despite the increase in the number of authorised public fixed voice telephony 
operators from 635 in 1998 to 1237 in 2004. In railways, problems with access to the 
international network, inadequacy of the regulatory framework or simply the low 
attractiveness of the market limit the emergence of competition. (EU Commission, 2005a: 6) 
The extent of distortions to competition is also confirmed by ERGEG (2006), who pint out to 
the cultivation of ‘European champions’ through cross-border mergers. According to ERGEG 
these ‘European champions’ might well lead to future market dominance - despite or perhaps 
because of recent developments towards market integration. National regulators ‘are unable to 
effectively monitor cross-border unbundling.’ Therefore, a single company operating in one 
country may own subsidiaries in another country, and operate its network in a way to benefit 
the affiliate in the neighbouring country.   
ERGEG (2006: 7) also indicates that reports of NRAs in the gas and electricity markets 
contain ‘alarming cases where regulators have increasingly had to coordinate decisions with 
political decision- makers’. In other cases, governments have been able to overrule decisions 
taken by the regulators – ‘setting returns on capital or giving direct instructions to the board of 
directors of the regulator.’  ERGEG had already drawn attention to these problems in its 2005 
report, however the situation has deteriorated over the year. The main reason is that rising 
energy prices and tighter capacities have been used to justify intervention into a market that is 
perceived not to deliver secure supply at low prices. However, this intervention is carried out not through regulators but through political discretion. This is a recipe not only to undermine 
the authority/credibility of the regualtors but also to induce the latter to lean towards the 
regulated. 
Given this evidence, it is difficult to uphold the argument that the lack of association between 
regulatory indicators and price outcomes is a temprary aberration. On the contrary, it is 
related to limited regulatory independence/competence, high levels of market concentration, 
and low levels of transparency requirements in existing legislation. 
 
4.3  Regulation and consumer switching 
The extent of switching between suppliers of network services is a significant indicator of the 
scope for competition. Tables 7 amd 8 below provide information on this indicators in the gas 
and electricity markets. Switching data is not available available for telecommunications and 
it is irreelvant for rail transport.  
Table 7: Switching estimates - electricity  
  Large industrial users   Small commercial/domestic users 
 
Since market 
opening  
During 
2003 
Since market 
opening   During 2003 
Austria   22%  7%  3%  1% 
Belgium   35%  8%  19%  19% 
Denmark 50%  22%  5%  5% 
Finland 50%  16%  n.k  4% 
France   22%  n.k  n.a  n.a 
Germany 35%  n.k  6%  n.k 
Greece 0%  0%  n.a  n.a 
Ireland 50%  6%  1%  1% 
Italy   c.15%  n.k  n.a  n.a 
Luxembourg 10%  n.k  n.a  n.a 
Netherlands   30%  n.k  35%  n.k 
Portugal 9%  7%  1%  1% 
Spain   18%  5%  0%  0% 
Sweden 50%  5%  n.k  10% 
UK 50%  n.k  50%  22% 
Source: EU Commission (2005b: 5) 
n.a.: Not applicable 
n.k. = No information 
 
In the elctricty market, there are 5 of member states where about 50% of the large industrial 
users have switched from one supplier to the toher since market opening. These are Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK.   In the remining 10 member states, the rate of switching by large industrial users ranged between about 10 - 35 per cent. Despite the 
variation, the evidence indicate a significant level of switching activity by large users of 
electricity. However, the rate of switching is very low among small commercial and houshold 
users – with the exception of the UK (50% since market opening), The Netherlands (35%) 
and Belgium (19%). In fact, in some member states switching between suppliers is either not 
allowed or has been intorduced only recently. A similar trend is observable in the gas industry 
too. As can be seen from Table 8 below, in only two member states (Italy and the UK) the 
rate of switching was significant among small users.  
 
 
Table 8: Switching estimates: GAS (note pp: 6) 
  Large industrial users   Small commercial/domestic users 
 
Since market 
opening  
During 
2003 
Since market 
opening  During 2003 
Austria   9.0%  9.0%  0.5%  0.5% 
Belgium   60.0%  n.a  4.0%  4.0% 
Denmark 30.0%  3.0%  n.a n.a 
France   25.0%  5.0%  n.a  n.a 
Germany 7.0%  n.k  <2%  0.0% 
Ireland >50%  1.0%  n.a  n.a 
Italy   30.0%  n.k  35.0%  35.0% 
Luxembourg <5%  n.k  n.a  n.a 
Netherlands   30.0%  n.k  2.0%  n.k 
Spain   >50%  22.0%  5.0%  5.0% 
Sweden n.k  n.k  n.a  n.a 
UK >50%  19.0%  47.0%  13.0% 
Source: EU Commission (2005b: 6) 
n.a.: Not applicable 
n.k. = No information 
 
 
When taken in conjunction with inadequate transparency indiators in Table 4 above, the very 
low levels of switching by small users may suggest that this user category have not been able 
to benefit from lower prices as much as the large users have. However, the low rate of 
switiching in this category may also be due to regulated end-user prices, which may be kept 
artificially low. Neverthless, the evidence on price gas and electricity prices does not support 
this argument. The electricity price index increased form 100 in 1997 to 105 in 2005 for both 
large and small users. In the gas market, the price index increased from by 33% from 1997-
2005 for small users, whereas the rate of increase was slightly higher at 55% for large usrs. 
(See, Ugur 2007a: Table 2).  
 
  
5.   Conclusions 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the quality of regulation in general tends to report 
pessimistic findings. Regulators, in contrast to declared intentions, tend to remain ineffective 
in reducing the price-cost margins of companies in oligopolistic or monopolistically 
competitive markets. In fact, there is also theoretical and empirical work demonstrating that 
the demand fro regulation originates from such companies rather than the consumers that the 
regulator is expected to protect. True, there are variations in the findings about the extent of 
regulatory capture that would result from strategic interaction between different players 
(consumers, suppliers, the government and the regulators). However, these variations are 
about the extent of regulatory capture - and not about whether capture does occur.  
 
The evidence analysed above enables us to verify the extent to which the emerging regulatory 
regime in EU network industries has been designed in a manner that would minimise the risk 
of regulatory capture. We have conducted our investigation by examining the ex ante and ex 
post indicators of regulatory quality in the EU network industries. On the positive side, we 
have established that the co-existence of EU- and national-level legislation and regulatory 
bodies is likely to reduce the risk of regulatory capture. In addition, we have established that 
there is scope for the diffusion of bets regulatory practice through the coordination and 
cooperation activities of the EU-level regulatory bodies, which incorporate the representatives 
of national regulators.  
 
On the negative side, however, we have identified a large number of ex ante and ex post 
indicator that suggests that the emerging European regulatory regime is less than optimal. As 
far as ex ante indicators are concerned, we have established that the regulatory competence 
and institutional strength of NRAs are highly unequal across countries and there is significant 
discrepancy between the two indicators in each member state. In addition, the level of 
transparency with respect to price and network access is inadequate in the gas and electricity 
markets. As far as ex post indicators are concerned, the available evidence clearly 
demonstrates that there is no statistically significant correlation between indictors of 
regulatory strength/competence on the one hand and the level of market opening or prices on 
the other. This lack of correlation suggests that the strength/competence of national regulators 
is not a predictor of the price level in member states. It also suggests that the 
strength/competence of national regulators is not commensurate with the level of market opening at the national level. Finally, we have also established that a decade of market 
opening and regulation has not led to high levels of switching among small users of electricity 
and gas – even though non-availability of data has prevented us from assessing the switching 
rate in the telecommunications industry.  
 
The findings summarised above can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that the regulatory regime in EU network industries is still in its early stages of 
development and that experiencing-sharing and learning may increase its effectiveness in the 
future. On the other hand, it can also be argued that time is not necessarily a remedy for the 
transaction cost and informational asymmetries that generally lead to regulatory capture. 
Evidence on the US experience, which provides the most relevant comparator for the 
European regulatory effort, lends support to the second interpretation. Although it would be 
too hasty a generalisation to argue that the European regulatory regime is bound to be plagued 
with regulatory capture problems experienced in the US, the result would depend crucially on 
the interaction between EU- and national-level regulatory arrangements. It remains to be seen 
whether both EU and national regulatory arrangements would interact in such a way as to 
minimise the risk of regulatory failures in the EU. 
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